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ABSTRACT The ‘low-volatility anomaly’ is the counter-intuitive observation that portfolios
of low-volatility stocks tend to yield higher risk-adjusted returns than portfolios of high-
volatility stocks. In this article, we investigate if the anomaly holds, not only for portfolios
consisting of individual low-volatility stocks, but for portfolios that have been optimized to
minimize aggregate volatility. We exploit patterns in historical price fluctuations to identify
optimized portfolios whose aggregate volatility is expected to remain low. These portfolios
are evaluated by comparing them against the performance of market capitalization and low-
volatility quintile benchmarks out-of-sample. The results reveal that, as well as outperforming
 2017 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8272 Journal of Asset Management Vol. 18, 4, 326–339
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the market, both in terms of returns and risk, optimized low-volatility strategies also out-
perform the S&P Low-Volatility Index. These findings provide further support for a low-
volatility effect, and imply that the root of the anomaly may lie with a failure to exploit
diversification opportunities.
Journal of Asset Management (2017) 18, 326–339. doi:10.1057/s41260-016-0036-1;
published online 19 January 2017
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INTRODUCTION
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM)
states that the returns of a given stock should
be a linear function of its beta (i.e. market
risk). In other words, returns should reflect
how risky a stock is relative to the market.
Surprisingly, this prediction does not match
observations: Over the last 50 years, low-
volatility portfolios across the world have
offered an enviable combination of high
average returns and small drawdowns,
bucking the intuition that risk should be
compensated with higher expected profits
(e.g. Haugen and Baker, 1991; Clarke et al,
2006; Baker et al, 2011). The deviation is so
compelling that Baker et al (2011) have
proposed it as a candidate for ‘‘the greatest
anomaly in finance’’.
There remains some debate as to whether
the anomaly is real, insofar as it can be
exploited in practice (Li et al, 2014). It may be
the case that the anomaly is small enough that
it would be eaten away by transaction costs, or
that it reflects some statistical quirk such as
future bias. A further question concerning the
low-volatility anomaly is whether it occurs at
the level of individual stocks, or whether it can
be further enhanced by exploiting the
relationships between stocks.
Our study seeks specifically to address
these three questions. First, we apply a buy-
and-hold strategy, which has minimal
associated trading costs as no rebalancing is
required. Second, we apply our strategy out-
of-sample, developing the portfolio based on
historical data and thus removing any
possibility of future bias. Third, we develop
our portfolios so as to exploit the
relationships between stocks, driving
volatility even lower in a bid to enhance
performance. We track the performance of
our portfolios into the future, to see how
they perform relative to the market and other
low-volatility benchmarks.
Before detailing our strategy, we first
review some of the evidence supporting the
existence of a low-volatility effect.
EVIDENCE OF A LOW-
VOLATILITY ANOMALY
Investigating a broad sample of international
developed markets, Ang et al (2009) found that
stocks with recent past high idiosyncratic
volatility had lower future average returns.
Across 23 markets, the adjusted difference in
average returns between highest and lowest
quintile portfolios, sorted by volatility, was
-1.31% per month. This effect was found to be
individually significant for every G7 country
(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United States, and the United Kingdom),
suggesting that the relation between high
idiosyncratic volatility and low returns is not
just a sample-specific or country-specific effect,
but a global phenomenon.
Blitz and van Vliet (2007) provided
further empirical evidence that stocks with
low-volatility earn higher risk-adjusted
returns than the market portfolio, even after
controlling for well-known effects such as
value and size. They found that the annual
alpha spread of global low versus high-
volatility decile portfolios amounted to 12%
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over the 1986–2006 period, observing
independent effects in the US, European and
Japanese markets.
Baker and Haugen (2012) analysed 33
different markets during the time period
from 1990 to 2011, including non-survivors.
They computed the volatility of total return
for each company in each country over the
previous 24 months, ranking stocks by
volatility and grouping them into deciles. In
each one of the 21 developed countries, the
lowest volatility decile had both lower risk
and higher return, leading to substantial
divergence in Sharpe ratios.
In another study, Clarke et al (2006)
found that minimum variance portfolios,
based on the 1,000 largest US stocks over the
1968–2005 period, achieved a volatility
reduction of about 25%, while delivering
comparable, or even higher, average returns
than the market portfolio.
Ang et al (2009) have pinpointed U.S.
markets as the source of the anomaly.
Specifically, they found that the low-
volatility anomaly in international markets
strongly co-moves with the anomaly for U.S.
stocks. After controlling for U.S. portfolios,
the alphas (i.e. risk-adjusted overperformance
relative to the market) of portfolio strategies
trading the idiosyncratic volatility effect in
various international markets are
insignificant. Thus, Ang et al (2009) argue
that the global idiosyncratic volatility effect is
captured by a simple U.S. idiosyncratic
volatility factor. In the following sections, we
consider some possible explanations for the
existence of this U.S.-based anomaly.
Longshot payoffs
One possible explanation is that people are
predisposed to express risk-seeking utility
towards longshot payoffs, while expressing
risk aversion towards lower volatility returns
[see prospect theory; Tversky and Kahneman
(1992)].
Buying a low-priced, volatile stock is like
buying a lottery ticket: There is a small
chance of it multiplying significantly in value
in a short period, and a much larger chance of
it declining in value (Baker et al, 2011).
Kumar (2009) found that some individual
investors do show a clear preference for
stocks with lottery-like payoffs, measured as
idiosyncratic volatility or skewness. Applying
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) cumulative
prospect theory approach, Barberis and
Huang (2009) concluded that a positively
skewed stock can be overpriced because of its
skewness, and thus earn a negative average
excess return.
Shefrin and Statman (2000) point out that
buying many stocks destroys upside lottery
potential, while buying a few volatile stocks
leaves upside potential intact. This way of
thinking is consistent with the finding that
most naive private investors only hold about
1–5 stocks in their portfolio, thereby largely
ignoring the diversification benefits that are
available within the equity market (Blitz and
van Vliet, 2007). This effect may cause high-
risk stocks to be overpriced and low-risk
stocks to be underpriced (Blitz and van Vliet,
2007). According to Jiang et al (2009), the
idiosyncratic volatility anomaly is indeed
stronger among stocks with a less sophisti-
cated investor base, as would be expected if
the anomaly had a behavioural origin.
Lack of leverage
Baker and Haugen (2012) argue that the root
of the anomaly lies with the structure of the
investment environment. They posit that the
compensation structures and internal stock
selection processes at asset management firms
motivate managers to hold more volatile
stocks and shun low-risk stocks.
Leverage is needed to take advantage of the
low-volatility anomaly: investors need to hold
greater volumes of stock in order to achieve
the same level of risk. If a low-risk stock
portfolio has a volatility which is, say, two-
thirds of that of the market, then 50% leverage
needs to be applied in order to obtain the same
level of volatility as the market. While this
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might seem straightforward, in practice many
investors are not in a position to apply lever-
age, and thus cannot exploit the opportunity
(Blitz and van Vliet, 2007). Borrowing
restrictions were originally identified by Black
(1993) as an argument for the relatively good
performance of low-beta stocks.
Although precise statistics are elusive, it
appears that relatively few mutual funds use
leverage. For example, Baker et al (2011)
spot-checked and found that the five largest
active domestic equity mutual funds did not
use any leverage as of 1st July 2010. Fur-
thermore, the Investment Company Act of
1940 actually prohibits U.S. mutual funds
from using more than 33% leverage.
Baker et al (2011) also point out that the
typical institutional investor’s mandate to
beat a fixed benchmark discourages arbitrage
activity for both high-alpha, low-beta stocks
and low-alpha, high-beta stocks, since these
are unlikely to simultaneously track and
surpass the benchmark.
As it turns out, such benchmarking is
common: 61% of U.S. mutual fund assets are
benchmarked to the S&P 500, and 95% are
benchmarked to some popular U.S. index
(Sensoy, 2009). Under current U.S. SEC
rules, all mutual funds must, in their
prospectus, select a benchmark and express
the returns of the fund relative to that
benchmark (Baker et al, 2011).
The focus on these benchmarks means that
institutional investment managers are less
likely to exploit the low-volatility anomaly,
especially when leverage is not available (see
Cornell and Roll, 2005). Instead, an invest-
ment manager who is seeking to surpass a fixed
benchmark without access to leverage is better
off exploiting mispricings among stocks with
close to market risk (i.e. a beta near 1).
Money tends to be invested in asset classes
that have performed well in the past, and with
asset managers who have demonstrated above
average performance (Blitz and van Vliet,
2007). For this reason, outperformance in up
markets may be more desirable than outper-
formance in down markets (Blitz and van Vliet,
2007). Asset managers may thus be willing to
overpay for stocks which are inclined to out-
perform in up markets; these tend to be high-
volatility stocks. At the same time, they are
likely to underpay for stocks which outperform
in down markets, which tend to be low-
volatility stocks (Blitz and van Vliet, 2007).
All of these factors combine to produce a
low-volatility anomaly, whose essence is that
low risk is undervalued relative to high risk
(Baker et al, 2011). In a benchmarked world
without access to sufficient leverage, the low-
volatility anomaly emerges as a natural
consequence.
Betting against beta
The concept of volatility is closely related to
that of beta coefficient, which describes the
volatility of an asset relative to the market, in
essence the correlated relative volatility (by
definition the market has a beta of 1). In line
with other findings on the low-volatility
anomaly, Black (1993) found that, in the
period from 1931 to 1965, low-beta stocks in
the U.S. did better than the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) predicts, while high-
beta stocks did worse.
Frazzini and Pedersen (2014) provided
empirical evidence that portfolios of high-
beta assets have lower alphas and Sharpe
ratios than portfolios of low-beta assets. They
found that high beta is associated with low
alpha for US equities, 20 international equity
markets, treasury bonds, corporate bonds,
and futures. They also found that a betting-
against-beta (BAB) factor, which is long
leveraged low-beta assets and short high-beta
assets, produces significant positive risk-ad-
justed returns, and rivals standard asset pricing
factors (e.g. value, momentum, and size) in
terms of economic magnitude, statistical sig-
nificance, and robustness across time periods,
subsamples of stocks, and global asset classes.
Frazzinia and Pedersen’s (2014) claim that
constrained investors stretch for return by
increasing their betas is supported by their
finding that both mutual funds and individual
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investors hold securities with betas that are
significantly above one. In contrast, leveraged
buyout funds, such as Berkshire Hathaway,
tend to buy stocks with betas below one.
These investors could be taking advantage of
the BAB effect by applying leverage to safe
assets and being compensated by investors
facing borrowing constraints who take the
other side. According to Frazzini and Peder-
sen (2014), Warren Buffett gets rich by betting
against beta, that is, buying stocks with betas
significantly below one and applying leverage.
Low-volatility stocks, or low-
volatility portfolios?
Given the outperformance of low-volatility
stocks, the question arises of whether it is
possible to beat the performance of low-risk
quintile portfolios by taking advantage of the
benefits of diversification (Baker et al, 2011).
For example, a portfolio of two uncorrelated
but slightly more individually volatile stocks
can be even less volatile than a portfolio of
two correlated stocks with lower volatility.
Does optimizing volatility in this way amplify
the low-volatility effect?
Investigating this possibility, Baker et al
(2011) constructed a minimum-variance port-
folio that took advantage of finer detail in the
covariance matrix. Following the estimated
security method of Clarke et al (2006), they
compared the returns of an optimized low-
volatility portfolio against the performance of
the lowest volatility quintile for the period
1968–2008. The total volatility was reduced
from 12.7% for the bottom volatility quintile to
11.5% for the optimized portfolio. Because this
reduction in volatility comes at no expense in
terms of average returns, the Sharpe ratios are
substantially better in the optimized case (0.47
versus 0.38 for bottom quintile).
Is the effect real?
On the other side of the argument, Li et al
(2014) have claimed that portfolio-rebalanc-
ing requirements, and the impact of
associated transaction costs on low-volatility
portfolios, eliminates the benefits of the
purported anomaly.
They suggested that, over the period
1963–2010, the existence and trading efficacy
of the low-volatility stock anomaly was more
limited than widely believed, and could not
be exploited in practice. For example, they
found that abnormal returns are concentrated
among smaller stocks, which suffer from a
lack of liquidity and thus attract high trans-
action costs. When low-priced stocks are
omitted from value-weighted long/short
portfolios, alpha is largely eliminated.
In summary, there is strong evidence of a
low-volatility anomaly, perhaps caused by a
combination of risk-seeking utility, inap-
propriate benchmarking, and a lack of access
to leverage. Nevertheless, the question has
been raised by Li et al (2014) as to whether
this anomaly can be easily exploited. This is
the question addressed by our study.
THE STUDY: OPTIMIZING
PORTFOLIOS BY MINIMIZING
HISTORICAL VOLATILITY
In the following study, we investigate
whether the low-volatility can be easily
exploited to generate profit. First of all, a
long-term buy-and-hold strategy is adopted,
thus avoiding the issues of low liquidity and
high transaction costs identified by Li et al
(2014). Secondly, in contrast to previous
studies (e.g. Baker et al, 2011), our analysis is
guaranteed out-of-sample, insofar as the test
data were not available when the training
data were collected.
In-sample analyses, whereby portfolios are
developed and tested on the same dataset, are
problematic because they invite overfitting.
It is often easy to find some manipulation of
the data that leads to outperformance by
exploiting random variation in the dataset,
variation which is unlikely to persist into the
future (see Hawkins, 2004; Maguire et al,
2012). Accordingly, it becomes difficult to
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differentiate between models which have
been overfitted to the data versus those
whose development has not been influenced
by random quirks. One way to control for
overfitting is to take into account the length
of the model relative to the amount of data
compression it achieves (see Li and Vitya´nyi,
2008). Another, more straight-forward,
method is to separate the training set and the
test set.
A separate issue which arises when
delineating training and test sets of historical
returns is that the training set will inevitably
be older then the test set, raising the
possibility of contamination by future bias.
For example, if we look at the S&P 500
stocks that are in the index today, and track
them back 20 years, we will see that these
stocks considerably outperform the market.
The reason is that they are future biased and
fail-proof: These companies are the ones that
are guaranteed to survive and grow to take
their place in the S&P index 20 years into the
future. This information was not available to
historical investors, thus the selection of
current S&P 500 stocks leaks information
from the future into the past. In order for a
study of this type to be fully reliable, its
training data must have been identified
before the test data were knowable.
Our study is truly out-of-sample. We
collected the training data, namely daily stock
market price fluctuations for the S&P 500
companies, before the test data had been
generated by the stock market. Then we
waited for two years. The training period was
the 2.5-year period from 1st January 2008 to
30th June 2011. The test period was the
2-year period from 1st July 2011 to 30th June
2013.
Adjusted close values for each stock were
obtained from the Datastream Worldscope
Fundamentals online historical financial
database. We only considered companies that
were in the S&P 500 at the moment the data
were drawn down, namely 30th June 2011,
and which had continuous data available
throughout the training period. For the
analysis of the test period, we continued to
track the selected companies in the various
portfolios, even if they later slipped out of the
S&P 500. Companies that disappeared due to
mergers or acquisitions during the test period
were simply removed from the portfolios on
the date their trading data ceased to be
available.
The first question we addressed using this
dataset was that of whether low volatility
persists: Does the fact that a stock was low
volatility in the past imply that it will be low
volatility in the future? We found that the
correlation between S&P 500 stock
volatilities for the training and test periods
was 0.65, p\.001. Clearly, volatility is
something that persists. Unlike returns, it
does not fluctuate randomly between
periods. The next question to be answered
was whether volatility-optimized portfolios
tend to outperform the market into the
future using a simple buy-and-hold strategy.
Optimization algorithms
It has previously been claimed that the low-
volatility anomaly is specifically related to
high-beta stocks, and that profits can be
earned by betting against beta, that is, using
leverage to buy low-beta stocks, and building
up a low-beta portfolio (e.g. Black, 1993;
Frazzini and Pedersen, 2014). However, if
we optimize a portfolio to minimize beta,
then, without exception, all of the weight is
placed on the single lowest beta stock avail-
able. Intuitively, this is not desirable, because
an undiversified portfolio stands a greater risk
of failing to maintain its fitted features (e.g.
becoming high beta). This leads us to suggest
that, while often associated with low beta,
the low-volatility anomaly more specifically
concerns diversification, and the failure of
investors to exploit it. If we optimize a
portfolio to minimize volatility rather than
beta, then multiple stocks will be selected,
matching the intuition that diversification
among several companies is a superior
strategy.
Evidence in support of a low-volatility
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In total, we implemented four different
algorithms for minimizing volatility, and
compared these against the S&P 500, the
lowest volatility quintile of the S&P 500,
and, for the test period, the S&P Low-Vo-
latility Index. This index takes the 100 least
volatile stocks in the S&P 500, and weights
constituents relative to the inverse of their
corresponding volatility, with the least vola-
tile stocks receiving the highest weights. The
four algorithms, which we implemented in
Java, are described below in pseudocode.
Sequential tuner (Tuner)
This algorithm runs once for each stock in the
index. It moves along the stocks in order, and
the weights of each stock are incremented as
long as the standard deviation of the portfolio
continues to fall. If including a stock fails to
lower the standard deviation, the weight is set
to zero and the algorithm moves to the next
stock until they all have been attempted.
For example, all of the stocks initially start
off with zero investment. The algorithm
considers stocks one at a time and, using a
greedy strategy, will choose the weighting for
each which minimizes the overall volatility so
far. The weighting of the first stock does not
influence volatility, so it will automatically be
set to the maximum weighting. The
weighting of the second stock will then be
amplified from zero upwards, as long as the
overall volatility of the portfolio keeps
dropping. Then the same process will be
applied to the third stock and so forth, until
all stocks have been ‘tuned in’ sequentially.
In the pseudocode below, WeightVec is the
weighted vector of stocks and Index is the
S&P500 index of stocks.
Low correlation portfolio (Low Corr)
This algorithm runs once for each stock in the
index. Each run picks a different stock to start
with, and then adds stocks into the portfolio
whose correlation with that starting stock is
lower than some specified threshold (we used a
value of 0.35). The amount of each stock added
is chosen randomly. The process iterates over
all stocks in the S&P 500 index, adding in those
that have a low correlation with one of the
stocks already in the portfolio. Once the stan-
dard deviation of the portfolio falls below some
specified value (we used 1.45%), a mutator (see
SD-Prob) is run to optimize its weightings.
Algorithm 1 Tuner
1: procedure GetPortfolio
2: WeightVec ← Repeat(0,Length(Index))
3: for i in Range(0,Length(Index)) do
4: while SD(WeightVec[i] ← WeightVec[i] + 1) <= SD(WeightVec) do
5: WeightVec[i] ← WeightVec[i] + 1
6: returnWeightVec
Algorithm 2 Low Corr
1: procedure GetPortfolio
2: loop:
3: Portfolio.add(RandInt(0,10) of Rand(Stock))
4: for Stock in Index do
5: for Items in Portfolio do
6: if CORREL(Stock,Items) < Threshold then
7: Portfolio.add(RandInt(0,10) of Stock)
8: if SD(Basket) < Value then
9: return Optimize(Portfolio)
10: GOTO loop
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Selective fixed weights (Fixed)
The numeric value of each stock’s weight is
fixed by its standard deviation. As per the
S&P Low-Volatility Index, the higher the
standard deviation, the lower the weight
(given by 1r). For each stock, the algorithm
runs through the other stocks, and if adding
them to the portfolio lowers the overall
standard deviation, the portfolio is updated.
In contrast to the S&P Low-Volatility Index,
which includes the full lowest volatility
quintile, stocks are added selectively so as to
minimize the overall historical volatility.
Standard deviation probabilistic
(SD-Prob)
This algorithm assigns probabilities to
stocks based on their standard deviations.
These probabilities control the likelihood
that the algorithm will select a given stock
for the portfolio. Portfolios are randomly
selected according to these probabilities and
tested. If the resulting standard deviation is
below a set threshold (we used 1.45%),
then a mutator is run on the portfolio to
fine-tune the weights. This mutator ran-
domly increments or decrements the stock
weights in the portfolio and saves the
changes if the standard deviation is
lowered.
The following tables show how the four
algorithms compared against the market and
low-volatility quintile portfolios in the
training and test periods. A range of standard
Algorithm 3 Fixed
1: procedure GetPortfolio
2: WeightVec ← [1/SD(Stock) for Stock in Index]
3: for i in Range(0,Length(Index)) do
4: if SD(TestVec[i] ← WeightVec[i]) < SD(TestVec) then
5: TestVec[i] ← WeightVec[i]
6: returnTestVec
Algorithm 4 SD-Prob
1: procedure GetPortfolio
2: SDVector ← SD(Stocks)
3: Prob ← [1/x3 for x in SDVector]
4: loop:
5: SamplePort ← [RandInt(0,50) if RandReal(0,1) < x for x in Prob]
6: if SD(SamplePort) < SD(Lowest) then Lowest ← SamplePort
7: if Lowest < Threshold then return Optimize(Lowest)
8: GOTO loop
9: procedure Optimize
10: while Attempts < 50 do
11: temp ← [x + 1 if RandReal(0,1) < 0.1 else x − 1 if RandReal(0,1) >
0.9 else x for x in Lowest]
12: if SD(temp) < SD(NewVec) then NewVec ← temp
13: Attempts + 1
14: return NewVec
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metrics is given including annualized
volatility, annualized return, Sharpe ratio
(excess return to standard deviation), beta
coefficient (correlated relative volatility with
the market), Treynor’s ratio (excess return to
beta), Jensen’s alpha (abnormal return over
beta expectation), tracking error (standard
deviation of divergence from market) and
information ratio (excess return to standard
deviation of tracking error).
Finally, we include the randomness
deficiency coefficient metric (RDC; see
Maguire et al, 2013), which provides an
accessible overview of the extent to which
excess returns deviate from chance. RDC is
essentially a significance value for time ser-
ies. An RDC of 0 indicates that the overall
level of return fails to surpass that of the risk-
free rate. A positive RDC is the average
number of randomly generated time series
with the same characteristics as this one that
would have to be considered before coming
across one with excess returns as good as this
one. For example, an RDC of 3 implies
that, on average, we expect to discard three
similar randomly generated time series
exceeding the risk-free rate before finding
one better than this (slightly above chance
performance). The higher the RDC, the
more convincing the case that the portfolio
is outperforming, not by chance, but
because of some consistent edge. A negative
RDC indicates that a portfolio has per-
formed so badly that shorting it would have
yielded performance above the risk-free
rate.
As can be seen from Table 1, each of our
four algorithms successfully identified port-
folios that had lower volatility than the
market, and even lower than the bottom
volatility quintile. In addition, these port-
folios involved far fewer stocks, ranging
from 43 to only 8. There was also a strong
correlation between returns and volatility,
with the algorithm-derived portfolios
obtaining higher RDCs than the benchmark
portfolios. Figure 1 plots the time series of
the market and bottom quintile versus the
top-performing strategy, namely Selective
Fixed Weights. Of course, the key question
was whether these portfolios, trained on
historical data, were either overfitted, or
would maintain their outperformance into
the future.
Table 2 reveals the performance of the
same set of portfolios out-of-sample. Every
low-volatility strategy remained lower
volatility than the market into the future.
Furthermore, all strategies bar one yielded
greater returns than the market, and positive
alphas, leading to better Sharpe ratios and
RDCs. The S&P Low-Volatility Index out-
performed the bottom volatility quintile, but
was itself outperformed by two of our four
algorithms. The best performer of all was the
Selective Fixed Weights algorithm, which is
very similar to the S&P Low-Volatility
Index, insofar as stocks are inversely weigh-
ted relative to their volatility. However, the
key difference is that in our algorithm the
stocks are added selectively so as to minimize
historical volatility, while the Low-Volatility
Table 1: Performance of in-sample portfolios optimized to training data
Tuner Low Corr Fixed SD-Prob Market Quintile
# stocks 38 13 43 8 500 100
vol (annual) 15.5% 15.4% 16.7% 16.1% 28.4% 19.2%
return (ann.) 12.9% 12.8% 16.6% 20.6% -4.5% 13.8%
Sharpe ratio 0.83 0.83 0.99 1.28 -0.16 0.72
beta 0.5 0.48 0.52 0.46 1 0.64
Treynor’s ratio 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.44 -0.04 0.21
Jensen’s alpha 0.32 0.32 0.41 0.49 0 0.35
tracking error 1.14 1.2 0.99 1.25 0 0.8
inform. ratio 0.32 0.3 0.45 0.43 NA 0.48
RDC 2.47 2.46 3.05 4.66 -1.15 2.11
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Index includes the full lowest volatility
quintile. The 43 stocks in our algorithm-
derived portfolio achieved an annualized
volatility of 12.1% and an RDC of 7.62,
compared with 13.4% and 6.56 for the Low-
Volatility Index.
Although the performance advantage of
our top-performing Selective Fixed Weights
algorithm over the S&P Low-Volatility
Index was only marginal, this superior per-
formance was achieved with far fewer stocks
(43 versus 100), and without any updates to
composition over the 2-year period, leading
to significant savings as regards transaction
costs. Even our SD-Prob portfolio, including
only 8 stocks, managed to achieve lower
volatility than the market out-of-sample, as
well as superior Sharpe ratio and RDC. The
fact that the S&P Low-Volatility Index is
rebalanced each quarter no doubt gives it an
advantage over our buy-and-hold strategy.
Further investigations are required to deter-
mine if performance can be pushed even
higher through regular rebalancing.
Figure 2 plots the time series of the market
and the S&P Low-Volatility Index versus our
top-performing strategy. As can be seen, the
Low-Volatility Index boasts slightly higher
growth (14.5% versus 13.8%) but it does so as
the expense of higher volatility, leading to a
lower Sharpe ratio and RDC. In support of
Baker et al’s (2011) proposal, this result sug-
gests that the low-volatility effect can indeed
be enhanced by diversifying the selection of
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Figure 1: Performance of various portfolios for training period.
Table 2: Performance of out-of-sample portfolios optimized to training data and applied to test data
Tuner Low Corr Fixed SD-Prob Market Quintile S&P Low
# stocks 38 13 43 8 500 100 100
vol (annual) 14.3% 14.7% 12.1% 13.6% 18.6% 13.4% 13.4%
return (ann.) 10.4% 9.4% 13.8% 14.9% 9.7% 13.9% 14.5%
Sharpe ratio 0.73 0.64 1.15 1.1 0.52 1.04 1.08
beta 0.66 0.66 0.59 0.58 1 0.68 0.66
Treynor’s ratio 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.26 0.1 0.2 0.22
Jensen’s alpha 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.2 0 0.16 0.18
tracking error 0.61 0.64 0.56 0.71 0 0.46 0.51
inform. ratio 0.02 -0.01 0.16 0.16 NA 0.2 0.21
RDC 3.02 2.57 7.62 6.64 2.07 5.89 6.56
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stocks within a low-volatility portfolio,
although further evidence is needed to bol-
ster this conclusion.
While Baker et al (2011) restricted their
optimization to allow only the bottom quintile
of low-volatility stocks, our algorithms were
able to select any stock, no matter how vola-
tile. Table 3 shows the percentage of stocks
selected by each of the algorithms that were
drawn from the bottom volatility quintile. The
fact that these portfolios involved some high-
volatility stocks raises the question of whether
overfitting could be reduced, and portfolio
performance enhanced, by restricting the
domain to the bottom volatility quintile.
Accordingly, we recomputed portfolios for the
four algorithms based only on these 100 lowest
volatility stocks. The results are shown in
Tables 4 and 5.
As can be seen in Table 4, our algorithms,
as expected, performed less well in-sample
when restricted in their choices, with most of
them registering higher volatilities and lower
RDCs. However, this drop in performance is
not necessarily a bad thing: The reduction in
choice may curtail the ability of the algo-
rithms to overfit, with positive implications
for future performance.
Table 5 describes the performance of the
same portfolios out-of-sample. Again, every
low-volatility strategy outperformed the
market. The Selective Fixed Weights algo-
rithm continued to outperform the S&P
Low-Volatility Index fund (RDC of 7.68
versus 6.56). However, although the Tuner
algorithm fared slightly better when restric-
ted, the other algorithms had higher volatil-
ities than before. This suggests that, in most
cases, allowing higher volatility stocks to be
added into a portfolio can actually be bene-
ficial. The results do not offer support for
artificially restricting the selection of stocks to
the bottom volatility quintile. It is worth
noting that the portfolios involving greater
number of stocks (e.g.[30) outperformed
those with fewer stocks (e.g.\10), suggesting
that a minimum-weighting constraint might
reduce overfitting for those algorithms that
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Figure 2: Performance of various portfolios for test period.
Table 3: Stocks in lowest volatility quintile
Tuner Low Corr Fixed SD-Prob
% Stocks in lowest quintile 78.9% 92.3% 90.6% 100%
Maguire et al
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tend to identify portfolios with fewer com-
ponents (see Maguire et al, 2014).
In sum, the results as a whole offer strong
support for the idea that low-volatility port-
folios can outperform the market even when
following a simple buy-and-hold strategy.
Every low-volatility portfolio in our study
achieved higher Sharpe ratios and RDCs
than the market. We performed a correlation
between annualized volatility and RDC for
the 25 unique portfolios involved in the
study, across both training and test periods.
The correlation between them was -0.79,
indicating a very strong negative relationship
between volatility and risk-adjusted portfolio
performance: The lowest volatility portfolios
performed best, and the highest volatility
portfolios performed worst.
CONCLUSION
Li et al (2014) questioned whether the low-
volatility anomaly could be exploited in
practice, claiming that rebalancing
requirements and transaction costs would
wipe out any potential benefits. We have
provided evidence that this is not the case: It
is possible to develop a low-volatility buy-
and-hold strategy based on historical daily
returns that continues to outperform the
market out-of-sample, with no need for
frequent rebalancing.
We have also provided some evidence that
optimized portfolios can outperform the S&P
Low-Volatility Index by exploiting the
different relationships that exist between
stocks and reducing the overall volatility of
the portfolio. Rather than relying on a
covariance matrix (see Baker et al, 2011), we
employed a variety of techniques to
minimize the historical volatility of the
portfolio itself. This performance was
maintained into the future. Further
investigations are required to find whether
these results hold up over different time
periods, to find the optimal training and
rebalancing periods, and to find strategies
which minimize the potential for overfitting.
Table 4: Performance of in-sample portfolios optimized to training data using low-volatility quintile
Tuner Low Corr Fixed SD-Prob Market Quintile
# stocks 27 9 35 10 500 100
vol (annual) 15.4% 16.2% 16.7% 15.7% 28.4% 19.2%
return (ann.) 16.4% 11.2% 14.1% 13.1% -4.5% 13.8%
Sharpe ratio 1.06 0.69 0.84 0.83 -0.16 0.72
beta 0.48 0.49 0.55 0.5 1 0.64
Treynor’s ratio 0.34 0.23 0.26 0.26 -0.04 0.21
Jensen’s alpha 0.4 0.28 0.35 0.32 0 0.35
tracking error 1.18 1.23 1.01 1.2 0 0.8
inform. ratio 0.37 0.26 0.39 0.31 NA 0.48
RDC 3.39 2.07 2.5 2.48 -1.16 2.11
Table 5: Performance of out-of-sample portfolios optimized to training data using low-volatility quintile and applied
to test data
Tuner Low Corr Fixed SD-Prob Market Quintile S&P Low
# stocks 27 9 35 10 500 100 100
vol (annual) 13.1% 16.2% 12.7% 15.4% 18.6% 13.4% 13.4%
return (ann.) 14.3% 9.2% 14.6% 10.6% 9.7% 13.9% 14.5%
Sharpe ratio 1.1 0.57 1.15 0.68 0.52 1.04 1.08
beta 0.60 0.72 0.62 0.70 1 0.68 0.66
Treynor’s ratio 0.24 0.13 0.24 0.15 0.1 0.2 0.22
Jensen’s alpha 0.18 0.05 0.19 0.08 0 0.16 0.18
tracking error 0.63 0.66 0.55 0.64 0 0.46 0.51
inform. ratio 0.17 -0.02 0.2 0.03 NA 0.2 0.21
RDC 6.68 2.25 7.68 2.78 2.07 5.89 6.56
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In practice, these results imply that the
capitalization-weighted S&P 500 is not the
most diversified index achievable. If all
investors invested optimally with full access
to leverage so as to maximize their expected
risk-to-reward ratio, then, as implied by
CAPM, return would indeed be a linear
function of beta: every possible source of
diversification would be fully exploited, and
long-term passive investing would be the
ideal form of long-term investment.
However, our results imply that it is possible
to develop portfolios that are more
diversified than the market, and hence
outperform the market.
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH)
asserts that financial markets are informationally
efficient (e.g. Malkiel and Fama, 1970).
Informational efficiency entails that current
prices reflect all publicly available information,
and that prices instantly change to reflect new
public information. Accordingly, all stocks, and
indeed all portfolios of stocks, should follow a
random walk, where knowledge of past events
has no value for predicting future prices
changes (Maguire et al, 2014).
However, the notion of short-term
individual stock efficiency described by the
EMH is a separate concept to that of long-
term market diversification efficiency. Even
if a market is prediction-efficient it may not
be diversification-efficient: Sophisticated
diversifiers may be drawing down a larger
proportion of the long-term risk premium
the market provides, leaving other naive
diversifiers to shoulder risk without the
expected rewards (Maguire et al, 2014). The
central tenet of CAPM, namely that return is
linearly related to beta, assumes that the
market represents the most diversified index.
But if that’s not true then investors who
simply buy the market index may be
transferring their risk premiums to
sophisticated diversifiers who hold lower
volatility portfolios (Maguire et al, 2014).
Why should diversification inefficiency
persist in the market? As pointed out by
Baker et al (2011) and Blitz and van Vliet
(2007), adherence to benchmarks, lack of
leverage and upmarket outperformance are
all likely to play a role. While there is much
focus by investment companies on exploiting
short-term pricing inefficiencies, there is less
awareness of long-term algorithmic
diversification strategies (e.g. Maguire et al,
2014; Choueifaty et al, 2013). While pricing
inefficiency can be exploited to generate
quick short-term profits, diversification
inefficiency only delivers over the longer
term, and requires greater tenacity to exploit.
If sophisticated diversifiers are winning,
then somebody else must be losing. The
growing exploitation of diversification
inefficiency may explain why stock market
returns have fallen short of expectations in
the 21st century (Maguire et al, 2014).
Sophisticated diversifiers who exploit the
low-volatility anomaly may be gaining more
reward per unit of risk than naive diversifiers,
who are taking on risk by buying the stock
market index, yet failing to achieve the
expected historical rewards (Maguire et al,
2014).
In conclusion, these results provide further
evidence in support of the low-volatility
anomaly. They reinforce the consensus that
the phenomenon is due to a failure by investors
to exploit diversification and reduce risk.
Although it has been argued that such failure is
linked to the inability to avail of leverage (e.g.
Baker and Haugen, 2012; Blitz and van Vliet,
2007; Black, 1993), it is worth noting that the
current study managed to outperform the
returns of the market without any use of
leverage. Thus, it may be that a combination of
factors gives rise to the anomaly, including the
emphasis on market-linked benchmarks and
the motivation of asset managers to overpay for
stocks that outperform in up markets.
NOTE
1. The material on diversification inefficiency presented in
the concluding section draws from research presented at
the IEEE CIFEr 2014 conference in London (Maguire
et al, 2014).
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